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IN THE SUPREl\1E COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
JACK~

A. MILLIGAN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs.MELVIN COY HARWARD,
KENNETH B. l\1:cDUFFY,
and C. E. LINDSEY,

Case No. 9121

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
MELVIN COY HARWARD

STATEl\IENT OF FACTS
In this brief, we shall also refer to the parties as
they appeared in the Court below.
\Ve do not fully adopt the State1nent of Facts related
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by plaintiff in his brief, as they do not properly reflect
many rnaterial details of the evidence adduced at the
trial. However, inasmuch as this defendant will recite
further pertinent facts in the Argument, pertaining to
the questions of law at issue, we shall not detail them here
for the sake of brevity.
Generally speaking, plaintiff's statement of facts
gives a sufficiently general picture of the facts and
nature of the litigation, to suffice for that purpose.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY WILFUL MISCONDUCT ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT, HARWARD.
POINT II
THE PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE ADDED RISK OF
DEFENDANT'S ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE CAUSED BY
DEFENDANT'S DRINKING.
A. THERE CAN BE NO JURY QUESTION WHERE
PLAINTIFF KNEW OF DEFENDANT'S DRINKING, AND
THE ACCIDENT WAS NOT THE RESULT OF WILFUL
MISCONDUCT.
ARGU~1EN·T

POINT I
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY WILFUL MISCONDUCT ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT, HARWARD.
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Plaintiff has assun1ed, in his brief, that in order to
prove wilful misconduct, all that need be shown is that
the driver intentionally or consciously acted, or failed
to act, and that an accident then happened. That such
an argurnent is cornpletely fallacious, seems almost unnecessary to argue.

"Unless he be unconscious, any driver of an
autmnobile is conscious of his conduct." Pettingill
v. Moede, 129 Colo. 484, 271 P2nd 1038.
A person who exceeds the speed lin1it; a driver who
looks to the right when he should have looked to the left;
a driver who n1erely lights a cigarette and in doing so
momentarily takes his eyes off the road, all can be said
to be acting intentionally. But the test of wilful and
wanton misconduct is of course, a great deal more complex. The Colorado Supreme Court in the Pettingill case,
(supra) wherein defendant relied on his snow tires and
did not follow advise to put on chains, and later skidded
off the highway, states:

"For the purpose of properly construing this
statute ordinary or simple negligence should be
considered as resulting from a passive mind, while
a wilful and wanton disregard expresses the
thought that the action of which complaint is made
was the result of an active and purposeful intent.
Wilful action means voluntary; by choice; intentional ; purposeful.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"Wantonness signifies an even higher degree
of culpability in that it is wholly disregardful of
the rights, feelings, and safety of others. It may
at times, even imply an element of evil. One may
be said to be guilty of wilful and wanton disregard
when he is conscious of his misconduct, and although having no intent to injure anyone, from his
knowledge of surrounding circumstances and existing conditions is aware that his conduct in the
natural sequence of events will probably result
in injury to his guest, and is unconcerned over the
possibility of such result.
"A failure to act in prevention of accident is
but simple negligence; a mentally active restraint
from such action is wilful. Omitting to weigh consequences is simple negligence; refusing to weigh
them is wilful."

"Without realization of the danger, it is unrealistic to say that he was intentionally heedlessly
reckless, guilty of wilful and wanton misconduct,
and disregardful of the safety or rights of his
guest, or others."
(Citing Ricciuti v. Robinson, 2 Utah 2d 45, 269
P.2d 282) (Emphasis added.)
"Wilful 1nisconduct is the intentional doing
of an act or intentional omitting or failing to do
an act, with knowledge that serious injury is a
probable and not merely a possible result, or the
intentional doing of an act with wanton and reckless disregard of the possible consequences. It involves deliberate intentional or wanton conduct
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in doing or 01nitting to do an act with knowledge
or appreciation that injury is likely to result
therefrom . . . Wilful misconduct connotes a
greater wrongdoing than mere negligence or even
gross negligence. It includes a conscious or intentional violation of definite law or rule of conduct
with the knowledge of the peril to be apprehended
from such act or failure to act."
The above was cited with approval in Ricciuti v.
Robinson, (supra) cited by plaintiff, and in which this
Court stated :
"There is no fact or combination of facts in
the record which showed a wanton or reckless
disregard of the consequences."
To permit a jury to deliberate on facts constituting
simple negligence only, where plaintiff must prove facts
showing wilful and wanton disregard, would be to completely destroy the purpose and meaning of the Guest
Statute, 41-9-1, U.C.A. 1953.
"There is no evidence from which it could
sensibly be found that appellant ... was guilty
of wilful misconduct unless we are to pervert the
plain meaning of the statute. It is one thing to
leave questions of fact upon which reasonable
minds might differ to the decision of a jury, but
quite another where there is only one possible
reasonable answer. Certainly the term 'Reasonable l\Iinds' would here lose all significance as a
practical, ordinary and common sense measure of
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conduct were we to so far stray from reality as to
hold that a mother's protective glance at her young
child could be considered as wilful misconduct
even at the time and place where the hazard was
considerable. Courts have sometimes held that law
is reason, which we take to mean reason according
to the standards of ordinary people in everyday
life. Although appellant turned her head to look
at the child and disregarded or failed to see the
stop sign, there is no evidence that her inattention
to her driving was more than momentary or that it
was done or continued for any appreciable distance ... It is admitted that prior to her momentary inattention to her driving appellant was driving slowly and in a cautious and careful manner.
A finding of wilful misconduct cannot be predicated upon mere inadvertence or even gross negligence."
Winn v. Ferguson, 132 Cal. App. 2d 539, 282 P2nd
515.
In Neyens v. Gehl, 235 Iowa 115, 15 N.W. 2d, 888,
where the driver sought to retrieve a lighted cigarette,
the Court states :
"We are aware of the principle that ordinarily
the matter of wilful misconduct is a jury question,
but not where the facts are such that reasonable
minds could not conclude that defendant showed
that type of intention or knowledge, or indulged
in that type of aggravated negligence necessary
to create liability on account of wilful misconduct
in
guest passenger cases."
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A cursory review of Appellant's citations, which we
will review in the order they appear in his brief, clearly
renders his own argu1nent untenable.

Johnson v. l\1arquis, 93 Cal. App. 2nd 341, 209 P 2nd
63 (at page 6 and page 14) involved facts wherein the
defendant was driving at speeds estimated from 80 to 100
miles per hour, on a dark night, with sufficient moisture
in the air to require windshield wipers, with visibility
below normal, and on a winding road with sharp curves,
when she collided into the rear of a truck with lights and
flares showing. The Court properly held that under those
facts, coupled with the defendant's drinking, the jury
was justified in finding the defendant guilty of wilful,
wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of her guest.
In Cox v. Johnson (Colorado) 339 P 2nd, 989, (pg
7 & 14) that Court points out that there was considerable
conflict in the evidence, but that the jury could have believed that defendant was warned by plaintiff to slow
down fron1 his high speed; the highway was icy and
defendant ignored that fact; the defendant had been
drinking, and plaintiff was not aware of that fact.
In Perry v. Schmitt, 184 Kan. 758, 339 P 2nd 36,
(page 8) the Supreme Court stated:
"We have never applied the doctrine of assumption of risk as a defense to (a guest case)
and we are not disposed to do so now."
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Even so, the evidence showed that the defendant was
driving at speeds from 80 to 85 miles per hour; that he
had previously been warned by the sheriff and the highway patrol officers to stop speeding; the accident occurred on Christmas Eve when the traffic was heavy; he had
been drinking; and with all those facts the Court held that
there was enough to be submitted to the jury.

In Ricciuti v. Roberts, 2 Utah 2nd 45, 269 P. 2nd, 282,
(pg 99) counsel for appellant has completely overlooked
the clear meaning of the decision. It is not enough to
show that the defendant's act was intentional; it must be
shown that the act was wanton and wilful.

In Gustaveson v. Vernon, 165 Nebr. 745,87 N.W. 2nd
395, (p. 10), counsel for appellant has neglected to advise
that the Nebraska law requires only gross negligence
which the Court defines as follows:

"Gross negligence within the meaning of the
motor vehicle guest statute is great and excessive
negligence or negligence in a very high degree.
It indicates the absence of slight care in the
perfonnance of a duty."
Furthermore, the facts, not pointed out by counsel,
were that the defendant was driving a car with a loose
steering gear; she knew that the car veered if she did
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not constantly watch her driving; when she moved her
attention frmn the road, to look back into the back seat
for a period of four seconds, she did so to play a joke
upon the plaintiff, in a pre-arranged plan with other
passengers to surprise plaintiff with her boy friend who
was hiding on the floor. The Court simply held, therefore, that there was a jury question as to whether her
conduct constituted gross negligence.

In Dirks v. Gates, 182 Kan. 581, 322 P 2nd, 750, (pg.
10) there was considerably more evidence than the mere
fact that the defendant had removed his eyes from the
road ahead. Plaintiff's brief failed to recite that the
defendant was engaged in a race with another vehicle
on a detour; driving at 80 to 85 miles per hour ; he had
been drinking; and the plaintiff had requested defendant
to slow down and not to try to pass the other car, which
the defendant ignored.

In Topel v. Correz, 273, Wis. 611, 79 N.W. 2nd 253
(pg 10 and 14) the Court did not hold as claimed by plaintiff, that the mere looking at the speedometer constituted
wilful misconduct. In that case, the Court held that there
was no evidence in the trial that the plaintiff knew that
the defendant had had more than one drink; or that he
had an opportunity to observe defendant's behavior prior
to the driving; or that the defendant's drinking was in
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the presence of the plaintiff or known by plaintiff. For
those reasons, the Court held that there was a jury question as to whether the plaintiff knew and appreciated the
hazard of riding in the automobile driven by the defendant, and therefore assumed the risk of the ride.

In SIMPSON v. MARKS, 349 Ill. App. 527, 111
N.E. 2nd 370 (pg 11) the Court pointed out that the defendant himself had testified that he had "gaped" at the
accident on the other side of the highway, traveled 200
to 300 yards while looking away and had slowed down
during that tilne to a speed of 20 to 25 miles per hour.
The Court held that if the jury believed the defendant's
version, it was justified in finding in favor of the plaintiff.

IN McGOWAN v. CAMP, 87 GA. App. 671, 75 S.E.
2nd 350, (pg 11) again, the statute requires the showing
of gross negligence only and is hardly a proper precedent
for facts required to show wanton or wilful misconduct.
The facts also showed that the car was traveling 50 miles
per hour, defendant had been having difficulty with the
children, she had looked back several times and before she
lost control of the car she had taken her eyes off the road
and tried to strike one of the children, during which time
the car traveled about 150 feet.
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In SHOEMAKER v. FLOOR, 117 Utah 434, 217 P
2nd, 382, (pg 13) the Honorable Court will recall that
there was evidence that defendant after the trip started,
wa~ driving at a high speed, on icy roads, and he refused
to heed the pleas of plaintiff to slow down.
In DAVIS v. HOLLOWELL, 326 Mich. 673, 40 N.W.
2nd, 641, 15 A.L.R. 2, 1160, (pg 15) plaintiff inadvertently
overlooked that the the facts showed defendant was
speeding; he ignored plaintiff's pleas to slow down; defendant became indignant and swerved from side to side
on a gravel road purposely, and at 60 miles per hour he
lost control, all in addition to his drinking.
In every single case cited by plaintiff, (other than
gross negligence cases) there were ample facts in evidence from which a jury could properly find wilful misconduct, and under circumstances which the jury reasonably could find that the plaintiff did not anticipate such
conduct.
We gladly test the facts of the case at bar with the
above cases. Those cases make it clear that there was no
jury question in this case.
The evidence is undisputed that plaintiff, Milligan,
had full knowledge of this defendant's drinking during
the evening prior to the accident.
As to the complete lack of wilful misconduct, we
turn to the record of the testimony.
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Plaintiff Milligan testified:
(R-164)
Q.

When you left the Lackawanna, Mr. :Milligan,
and started up toward the Noodle House,
did you observe anything unusual, or that
caused you any alarm, about the way the car
was being driven~

A.

No.

A.

Well, I was all relaxed; just laying over
there in the car this way (indicating) with
my arm up over the back of the seat ... I
was talking to Jim in the back, and Coy.
And I was riding along just relaxed, I didn't
pay any attention.

(R-165)
Q.

Did you feel it necessary for you to pay
attention to the way the car was being
driven, or participate in the driving in any
way~

A.

Well, I was right there watching it, and
everything was going along just perfect. I
couldn't watch for anything different.

(R-179)
Q.

Now, when he drove the car from the Lackawanna to the scene of the accident, there
was nothing wrong in the way he drove the
car~

A.

Not a thing.

Q.

He drove safely?

A.

Very.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
Q. And you weren't worried or apprehensive 1
A.

Not a bit.

Q. The speed of the car was nonnal1
A. Absolutely.
~Lr. Finnegan, who testified for plaintiff, fully confirmed plaintiff's praise of defendant's manner of driving.

(R-130)

Q. Now how did Coy drive from the Lackawanna
Club to the time of the accident 1 Describe
his manner of driving.
A.

Oh, he drived very good. As good as anybody else could drive.

Q. Was there anything unusual about the speed
he went1
A.

Nothing unusual about his driving, speeding
either. (See also R-71)

The cigarette incident, according to plaintiff, changes
the above "very good" driving to wilful and wanton misconduct. 11r. Finnegan, whom the defendant states was
handing him a cigarette, does not recall the incident. (R130). The only testimony was from the defendant.
(R-144)
A.

Well, I didn't see any, any truck ahead of me.
Right at that time, I asked ... well, Mr. Finnegan had lit a cigarette in the back, and I
asked him to light one for me, which I heard
the match strike. I turned just ... (illustrating)
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Q. Now you are indicating, Mr. Harward, that
you turned to your right, is that correct1
A.

That is right, just like that. (Indicating) As
I came back, the impact was right at that
mon1ent.... I had no time to put on brakes,
or . . .

Q. If I understand the motion you Inade, you
turned so that you looked back at Mr. Finnegan sitting in the back seat, is that correct!
A. That is right. I did. Took my eyes off the
road, that is right.
Q. In that process, ~lr. Harward, did you turn
your car out of the traveled portion of the
inside lane of traffic 1
A.

To my knowledge, no.

(R-149)
A.

Well, I know that it wouldn't have delayed me
over one second to make the turn to reach to
get it.

The witness on the stand demonstrated his movement
by turning his head to look over his right shoulder,
which of course was in the presence of the Honorable
Trial Judge. There was no indication that he looked in
the rear seat, other than by 1neans of his peripheral, or
side vision, as his body during the illustration, was not
shifted from his seated position.
These 1nen were all friends; the defendant had offered to buy the plaintiff and Finnegan their meal; en
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route to the cafe, he admittedly drove very carefully.
He failed to see the truck parked ahead, and not knowing
it was there, took his eyes off the road for not more than
one second. Not even a jury can change those elements
of "momentary inattention" into an intentional, wanton,
deliberate act with knowledge that injury is a probable
consequence and in reckless disregard of the safety of
his friends and guests.
POINT II
THE PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE ADDED RISK OF
DEFENDANT'S ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE CAUSED BY
DEFENDANT'S DRINKING.
A. THERE CAN BE NO JURY QUESTION WHERE
PLAINTIFF KNEW OF DEFENDANT'S DRINKING, AND
THE ACCIDENT WAS NOT THE RESULT OF WILFUL
MISCONDUCT.

It is common knowledge that a person's faculties
for safe driving are dulled and reduced proportionately
to the extent of liquor consumed. There is, of course,
more likelihood that a driver who has imbided will be involved in an accident, than a sober person. This likelihood increases to almost a certainty when the driver is
unquestionably intoxicated. A plaintiff guest knows the
added risk involved in riding with such a person, and
by law is presumed to anticipate the probability of an
accident, and therefore assumes the risk of the ride.
All well reasoned cases can be rationalized on the
following basis:
1.

If the driver's drinking was not enough to affect
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his driving ability, the Guest Statute bars the guest's recovery, unless wilful misconduct is shown.
2. If the driver's ability was impaired, and the
guest had knowledge of the anwunt so consumed, the
guest assumes the risk of an accident resulting frmn the
driver's impaired ability.
3. If, under No. 2, the driver engages in wilful misconduct, it is a question of fact for the jury as to whether
the guest should have reasonably anticipated the driver's
conduct, under the circumstances.
In the facts of the case at bar, plaintiff knew the
amount of beer consumed by defendant; he knew, or is
told by law that he knew, that defendant's ability was
impaired, whether he were totally drunk, or one quarter
drunk. The accident was the result of simple or ordinary,
negligence, and nothing 1nore. The plaintiff is barred
from recovery, and properly so.
"The effect of intoxicating liquor in depriving
a driver of care and caution and inducing physical
incapacity in the operation of a car is universally
known and tragically illustrated daily. Where one
becomes a guest and imprudently enters a car with
knowledge that the driver 1's so under the influence
of into1:icants as to tend to prevent him from exercising the care and caution whi,ch a sober and
prudent man would cntploy in the operation and
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control of the car, the guest is barred from recovery by reason of his contributory negligence,
and as having assmned the risk involved. Where
the evidence of such fact is without conflict, plaintiff is barred from a recovery as a matter of law.
(cases cited) Where the evidence is sufficient to
raise a question as to plaintiff's knowledge and
prudence, the determination of that issue must be
submitted to the jury.''
United Brotherhood v. Salter, 167 P 2nd 954 at 958
(Colo.).

Bear in mind that plaintiff complains of defendant,
on one hand, that defendant had been drinking, as the
basis for his action and yet he encouraged and participated with defendant in that very act. It matters not how
much defendant had to drink. If the defendant were intoxicated, (a fact we deny the evidence proved) it was as
apparent to plaintiff Milligan as to officer· Iba. The
fact that is important is the admitted fact that plaintiff
was drinking with defendant, drink for drink, during
the entire evening, and was fully aware of the amount
consumed inasmuch as he himself had the same amount
to drink as the defendant.

The California Courts have adopted, with sound
reasoning, "The Equal Culpability Rule". The reasoning
applies to Assumption of Risk, which we submit is the
same thing:
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" ... The circu1nstances of the case show that
the guest was a participant in the drunken orgy
in all the acts and events which led up to the intoxicated condition ... Recovery cannot be had
for the simple reason that both parties are equally
culpable."
" ... The efficient cause in the instant case
was intoxication, intoxication superinduced by the
active participation of the plaintiff, and we find
no line of demarkation seperating the result from
the cause, upon which the plaintiff can rely, and
at the same time hold the defendant liable in
damages."
Schneider v. Brecht, 6 Cal. App. 2nd 379, 44
P2nd 662.
That rule was approved in Price v. Schroeder, 35 Cal.
App. 2nd 700, 96 P2d 949, wherein the Court states:
"The Appellant was equally at fault in bringing about the very mental condition of which he
complains, and which led to the accident."
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff failed to sustain the necessary burden of
proof to properly establish any question for the jury
to determine.
The Honorable Trial Court correctly granted this
defendant's motion to dismiss.
The plaintiff had to 1naintain his action on some
reasonable showing of 'vilful misconduct on defendant's
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part, which he failed to do. He complains also of the defendant's sobriety, (although he testified defendant was
sober) and that while he drank drink for drink with defendant during the entire evening, accepted defendant's
offer of a free meal, enjoyed the careful driving of defendant enroute to the cafe, by some unexplainable reason, plaintiff maintains he should not have anticipated
the possibility of an accident happening, and that defendant should respond to him in damages. Justice disagrees.

We respectfully submit that the judgment of the
Trial Court should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

L. E. MIDGLEY
Attorney f~or Defendant and Respondent,
Melvin Coy Harward
1012 Boston Bldg., Salt Lake City, Utah
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